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Abstract 
This brief paper considers the political and social implications of the manner 
in which Australia has prosecuted the so-called ‘war on terror’. It does this 
by investigating relevant aspects of Australia’s anti-terrorism legislation and 
the performance of Australian security and law enforcement agencies, 
namely, the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and 
the Australian Federal Police (AFP). Focusing on the Haneef and Ul-Haque 
cases, the paper will consider how the political climate created by the former 
Federal Government’s legislative approach to the war on terror has 
influenced the performance of these organisations. By focusing on these two 
cases, the paper will demonstrate how racial, ethnic and religious 
stereotyping have informed and shaped Australia’s conduct of the war on 
terror. It will investigate the real potential for social division, and heightened 
national insecurity, that flows from the use and propagation of these 
stereotypes. The paper will also highlight the unfairness and prejudice that 
are inherent to racial and religious stereotyping. Finally, the paper will 
consider whether the Rudd Labor Government’s approach thus far to the war 
on terror differs in any significant measure from that of its predecessor and 
evaluate the prospects for real, progressive change.  
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Australia’s anti-terrorism legislation contains onerous provisions and powers 
which are supposedly necessary to protect the country from the threat of 
terrorism and from terrorist attacks. These have been subjected to rigorous 
scrutiny, critique and debate that have focused in the main on the 
legislation’s implications for human rights and civil liberties, the rule of law 
and integrity of the legal system, and executive government and 
parliamentary democracy in this country. The question of whether the 
legislation has strengthened or weakened Australian national security has 
also been a reasonably strong theme. While the legislation’s impacts on 
social and religious harmony have not been completely out of sight of most 
commentators, its racial and religious undercurrents and their social effects 
have generally been peripheral or secondary concerns. This paper is 
centrally concerned with investigating these undercurrents and exploring 
their implications for Australians of Islamic faith and their ability to live as 
citizens, residents or visitors in this country free from discrimination, 
harassment and persecution. 
In taking up this central concern, the paper will focus on two recent 
terrorism cases, the Haneef and Ul-Haque affairs. Both of these are 
instructive, for they reveal the racial and religious preconceptions that lay 
just beneath the surface of Australia’s anti-terrorism enactments and the 
political climate in which the legislation was enacted and which in turn it has 
helped to perpetuate. As will be demonstrated in the investigation of these 
two cases, the political climate has also enabled the security and law 
enforcement agencies to exceed their warrant and mandate and to violate the 
human rights and legal entitlements of terror suspects and to do so largely 
with impunity. Racial and religious stereotyping, implicitly associating 
people of Islamic faith and of Middle Eastern, South Asian or other 
‘dubious’ origin with the threat of terrorism, has been a key underlying 
factor in the creation and attempted perpetuation of this political climate.  
 
2. Haneef, Ul-Haque and the ‘War on Terror’: the Howard 
Government’s political and social legacy  
The manner in which the Haneef and Ul-Haque cases have been handled by 
the Rudd Labor Government since it came to office in November 2007 is 
important for it gives some insight into new Government’s thinking about 
the terrorist threat and how best to counter it legislatively and in other ways. 
The Government appears to be aware that these cases, particularly Haneef’s, 
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have triggered a degree of scepticism and unease in the Australian 
community about the way in which the war on terror had been prosecuted by 
the former government and the law enforcement and security agencies. 
Central to these concerns are the former Government’s attempts to use the 
legal system as a vehicle for pursuing its political and ideological agenda in 
the run-up to the 2007 Federal election and the manner in which this was 
seen to compromise or undermine long-established legal principles and 
presumptive rights.  
There was in all this also a measure of disapproval of the way in 
which the Howard Government sought to manipulate public opinion by 
fomenting racially motivated anti-Islamic fear and hatred in the wider 
community. In going to the lengths it did in attempting to make a negative 
example of Haneef (and, to a lesser extent, Ul-Haque) the Government only 
ended up handing its critics and detractors with evidence that the anti-
terrorism legislation was riddled with flaws and excesses inimical to 
individual rights and liberties. For, as became clear as the cases unfolded 
and publicly unravelled, if people like Haneef and Ul-Haque could be 
treated in the way they have been then so potentially could any member of 
the Australian community regardless of their ethnicity or religious 
predisposition. Just as the law is supposed to be blind to race, religion and 
the like so ironically, and paradoxically, could the anti-terrorism legislation 
be used to incriminate individuals of any or all races and religions. However, 
in the war on terror it just happens to be individuals of Islamic faith and of 
Middle Eastern or South/Central Asian origin who are, so to speak, in the 
firing line. 
In a 2006 paper analysing Australia’s anti-terrorism legislation, the 
present author pointed out with particular reference to the Anti-Terrorism 
Act (No. 2) 2005:  
Just as with the [Act’s] preventative detention and control 
provisions, the crime of sedition can be used by the authorities to 
persecute and harass members of the communities they regard as 
presenting a threat to Australia’s national security. This could have 
the effect of splitting up the Australian community into those 
regarded as posing no actual or potential threat and those who are 
suspected of posing such a threat. In a general climate of suspicion, 
fear and anxiety, this will almost certainly run the distinct risk of 
converting resentment and hostility into violent and terroristic intent. 
This is a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy providing the Government 
with a ready-made defence against charges that it is unfairly 
targeting certain groups and individuals. In any event, a more deeply 
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and dangerously divided Australian community could well be the 
result (Rix 2006: 437).  
The paper also noted the fact that, now as then almost a truism, it is Muslim 
communities and individuals, and people of Middle Eastern origin, who are 
most at risk from the persecution, harassment and arbitrary detention 
permitted in this and other anti-terrorism acts under the pretext of preventing 
terrorism and protecting national security (see, e.g., Lynch 2007 and Aly 
2007 which explore a number of these issues; all but one of the 19 terrorist 
organisations listed on the Australian Government’s national security 
website are self-proclaimed Islamic organisations the only exception being 
the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) (see Australian Government n.d.)).  
The Security Legislation Review Committee (SLRC, also known as 
the Sheller Committee) voiced similar concerns in its June 2006 Report 
noting the ‘profound impact’ which recent (unspecified) events had had on 
Muslim and Arab communities. It identified increasing fear, alienation and 
distrust of authority as the ‘biggest impacts’ on these communities.1 To 
address this issue, and to allay the fears and concerns of Muslim and Arab 
communities, the SLRC recommended that all Australian governments 
embark on a community education program to explain the meaning and 
intent of the anti-terrorism legislation (SLRC 2006: 8; for a more 
comprehensive analysis and discussion of the SLRC Report, see Rix 2008). 
This campaign should also address prejudices and fears in the wider (non-
Muslim) community.  
The Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) 
released its Review of Security and Counter Terrorism Legislation in 
December 2006. Chapter 3 of the Review was devoted to assessing the 
impact of the ‘new security environment’, particularly the anti-terrorism 
legislation, on Arab and Muslim Australians. It pointed to the rise in 
‘prejudicial feelings’ towards these Australians in the wake of the terrorist 
bombings in the United States, Britain, Spain and other parts of Europe, and 
Indonesia and noted that similar feelings had been awakened in other 
western countries. As the Review noted, the effects on these communities 
and their members of the rise in such feelings include fear and insecurity, 
discrimination and the perception that anti-terrorism laws are selectively 
applied to Muslim Australians, and confusion and uncertainty created by the 
sweeping offences and loose definitions of terrorism, terrorist organisation 
                                                 
1 The ‘profound impact’ which the unspecified events and the anti-terrorism legislation had had on Muslim 
and Arab communities is discussed at some length in the submissions to the SLRC from organisations such 
as the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, the Public Interest Advocacy Centre, the 
Australian Muslim Civil Rights Advocacy Network and the Federation of Community Legal Centres (Vic).  
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and terrorism-related offences contained in the legislation. All this has led to 
alienation and withdrawal by many Muslim Australians (including children) 
from the wider community, exacerbated by some of the sensationalist media 
coverage of police investigations into alleged terrorist organisations and 
suspects.2 To counter these effects, the Review recommended that the 
Federal Attorney-General’s Department improve its efforts to make 
comprehensive information about the anti-terrorism legislation available in 
appropriate community languages and generally to ensure that the Australian 
public has access to this information. To reinforce this, the Review 
suggested that information about appeal, redress and complaint mechanisms 
relating to the security and law enforcement agencies and the media be 
widely disseminated. The PJCIS Review also recommended that Australia’s 
strategy to counter terrorism include ‘a commitment to the rights of Muslims 
to live free from harassment and enjoy the same rights extended to all 
religious groups in Australia (PJCIS 2006: 38).’ With respect to the media, 
and in order to promote social cohesion, a statement on the importance of 
informed and balanced reporting should also be a part of Australia’s counter 
terrorism strategy.  
Some of these themes were taken up by Robert McLelland, the new 
Attorney-General, in a speech to the Security in Government Conference 
held in Canberra in December 2007 (this conference has been held annually 
since 2004). According to McLelland, the then recent change in Government 
presented an opportunity to introduce a new approach to national security, 
including the adoption of a broader perspective on the terrorist threat. This 
new approach would, like the old, include ‘hard intelligence and law 
enforcement’. But, in addition, ‘steps to promote greater inclusiveness and 
opportunity’ would be important elements (McLelland 2007). In calling for 
greater inclusiveness and opportunity, McLelland observed that ‘a terrorist 
threat in Australia has as much prospect of emanating from a disgruntled and 
alienated Australian youth as it does from the awakening of a sleeper cell 
planted by an overseas terrorist organisation.’ Fighting terror thus not only 
required ‘determination’, it also required just as surely an approach which 
promoted ‘justice, the rule of law, genuine peace and inclusive development 
(McLelland 2007).’ 
                                                 
2 The PJCIS review took submissions on the effect of the anti-terrorism legislation on Arab and Muslim 
communities from organisations including the Islamic Information and Support Centre of Australia in 
association with Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama’ah Association (confidential), Australian Muslim Civil Rights 
Advocacy Network, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission and the Public Interest 
Advocacy Centre.  
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A measure of commitment to justice and the rule of law is 
demonstrated in the new Government’s decision to hold an inquiry into the 
Haneef Case. During 2007, this case became a cause célèbre subjecting the 
former Government and its anti-terrorism legislation to intense media and 
public scrutiny in the lead up to the Federal election. The then Opposition 
had even called for a full judicial inquiry into the affair. It is worth 
recounting the particulars of the case.  
 
3. The case of Dr Mohamed Haneef 
On Monday, 2 July 2007 Dr Mohamed Haneef, an Indian doctor who 
worked as a registrar at the Gold Coast hospital in Queensland, was arrested 
and later charged (14 July) with recklessly supplying support to a terrorist 
organisation. This and other terrorist organisation offences were introduced 
into the Commonwealth Criminal Code by the Security Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002. Before being charged, Haneef had been 
arrested and subsequently questioned and detained under provisions of the 
Crimes Act 1914 as amended by the Anti-Terrorism Act 2004 (for analysis 
of these offences and provisions as they apply in the Haneef case, see LCA 
2008 and Lynch, McGarrity and Williams 2008; see also Rix 2006).  
In 2006, Haneef had given a SIM card to his cousin Sabeel Ahmed 
who lived in England. Sabeel Ahmed was subsequently charged with 
withholding information about a terrorist attack after his brother, Kafeel 
Ahmed, was found behind the wheel of the jeep that was crashed into the 
Glasgow airport building on 30 June 2007. The day before attempted car 
bombings outside two London nightclubs, in which Kafeel also was a central 
figure, had been thwarted. A little over two weeks after Haneef was charged, 
the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions dropped the charge on 
the basis that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction (ABC 
2007). Writing in the Sydney Morning Herald on 14 April 2008, David Marr 
reports that the Australian Federal Policy and the Commonwealth Director 
of Public Prosecutions both seem to have ignored evidence that Mohamed 
Haneef was innocent. The British police had become aware of this evidence 
soon after they began investigating Kafeel’s activities in 2007. Marr writes, 
‘The case against Dr Haneef always centred on allegations that his second 
cousin Sabeel Ahmed, a doctor practising in England, was part of a terrorist 
organisation. But in the Old Bailey on Friday [11 April] Mr Justice Calvert-
Smith accepted there was "no sign" of Ahmed "being an extremist or party 
to extremist views".’ (Marr 2008) This means that neither Sabeel Ahmed nor 
the SIM card could have been involved in Kafeel’s failed car bombings in 
London and Glasgow.  
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Before being charged, Dr Haneef had been detained in custody for 12 
days and was held for a further two weeks after being charged. Hours after 
Dr Haneef had been granted bail on the terrorism charge by a magistrate (16 
July), the then Immigration Minister Kevin Andrews cancelled Dr Haneef’s 
immigration (work) visa. This he did on the grounds that Haneef failed the 
Migration Act’s character test, in line with secret evidence Andrews claims 
was supplied to him by the Australian Federal Police, and placed him in 
immigration detention. He was released to home detention on 27 July and 
allowed to return to India on 29 July (his visa remained cancelled). In 
August, Justice Spender of the Federal Court reinstated Dr Haneef’s visa, a 
decision upheld by the Full Bench of the Federal Court in December 
quashing an appeal by Andrews (Peatling 2008). 
In a press interview announcing that the judicial inquiry into the Haneef 
affair would be conducted by former NSW Supreme Court Judge the 
Honourable John Clark QC, Attorney-General Robert McLelland explained:  
It is essential that we maintain public confidence in Australia’s 
counter-terrorism measures. Australians are entitled to be reassured 
that their national security agencies are functioning as effectively as 
they can be, and that our counter-terrorism laws are being 
appropriately enforced. Understandably, the Haneef case has 
prompted some in the community to question this (McLelland 
2008).  
The inquiry will examine and report on matters relating to the case 
including the arrest, detention, charging, prosecution and release of Dr 
Haneef and the cancellation of his visa. Among its other terms of reference, 
the inquiry will consider the operational performance and effectiveness of 
Commonwealth agencies involved in the matter, the effectiveness of 
cooperation and coordination between Commonwealth agencies and the 
relevant state law enforcement agencies and, finally, identify any 
deficiencies in the relevant anti-terrorism legislation and the relevant 
operational and administrative procedures and arrangements of 
Commonwealth agencies.3  
While the Attorney-General made clear that Mr Clarke would conduct 
the inquiry in a manner which did not compromise the safety and integrity of 
national security information or endanger ongoing investigations and 
                                                 
3 It is not clear whether the inquiry will consider why the Australian Federal Police investigation into Dr 
Haneef remained active well into 2008. As at the week beginning 31 March 2008, 9 AFP officers were still 
working on the case with the total cost of the investigation approaching AUD 8 million (Maley and 
O’Brien 2008). In a letter published in The Australian on 4 April, one correspondent wrote that it reminded 
him of the man ‘who was fixated on horses. He was digging deep into a load of horse manure dumped at a 
local tip, chuckling away to himself and muttering, “There has to be a horse in here somewhere.”’ 
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overseas trials either impending or underway (as in the UK), there would 
nevertheless be ‘opportunities for public input into the inquiry, including by 
advertising for submissions and conducting public forums on the operation 
of counter-terrorism laws and arrangements (McLelland 2008).’ All relevant 
Commonwealth agencies, including the Department of Immigration, had 
pledged their full cooperation with the inquiry which would at its conclusion 
release a report that would be made public (to be supplemented by a 
confidential report if circumstances dictated).  
Asked about the concerns he had expressed with ‘the broader suite of 
counter-terrorism laws that operate at the moment’ and the provisions they 
contain such as control orders and preventative detention, the Attorney-
General had an interesting and suggestive answer. Picking up on the 
interviewer’s reference to the Sheller Committee (SLRC) recommendations, 
McLelland pointed out that the Government is giving consideration to those 
recommendations, as well as to the review into the questioning and detention 
powers contained in the ASIO Act conducted by the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD in 2005 and to the Australian Law 
Reform Commission’s recommendations on the sedition provisions of ATA 
(No. 2) (for an analysis of the reports and recommendations produced by 
these various bodies, see Rix 2008). ‘One of the specific terms of reference 
of Mr Clarke is to report on the effectiveness of counter-terrorism laws in 
respect to the facts surrounding the Haneef matter and’, commented the 
Attorney-General, ‘obviously, there may be some relevant matters that we 
will have to consider in light of those recommendations (McLelland 2008).’ 
The inquiry into the Haneef case opened on 30 April. This happened to 
be the very day on which The Australian newspaper reported in a front-page 
story that the former Immigration Minister Kevin Andrews would testify to 
the inquiry that the Australian Federal Police had withheld from him the 
important information cited above proving that Sabeel Ahmed was not a 
member of a terrorist organisation and was not involved in the attempted 
London nightclub and Glasgow airport bombings (McKenna 2008). This 
issue not only raises important questions about Mr Andrews’ veracity and 
trustworthiness, but also about the AFP’s role in the Haneef debacle. The 
specific concerns relating to the AFP, besides the allegation of withholding 
evidence, include whether it ignored the crucial evidence proving that 
Haneef was innocent of the charges brought against him and, a related point, 
whether the British police had actually provided the AFP with the 
information demonstrating that Sabeel Ahmed was not involved in the 
London and Glasgow bombings. But Mr McLelland has refused to expand 
the Clarke inquiry’s terms of reference to enable it to investigate the 
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relationship between the AFP and its British counterparts, specifically, 
whether the British police had supplied the AFP with the information that 
exonerated Sabeel Ahmed and, indirectly, Mohamed Haneef as well. This is 
just one of the shortcomings of the Clarke inquiry that have attracted 
considerable media attention and public disquiet.  
Lawyers also have concerns that the powers granted the inquiry are not 
adequate, specifically, that it does not have the power to compel witnesses to 
give evidence or to face cross-examination and cannot compel the 
production of documents as would a Royal Commission or a properly 
constituted commission of inquiry (ABC 2008; McKenna 2008). Mr Clarke 
rejected a direct request from Stephen Keim SC, representing Dr Haneef, 
that the inquiry to be provided with the power to compel witnesses to give 
evidence. Stephen Keim made his request on the opening day of the inquiry, 
which could be its only public hearing (Maley 2008 and 2008a). This is a 
another concern, for Mr Clarke has indicated that interviews with witnesses 
would be conducted in private, ensuring that much of the evidence presented 
before the inquiry would not be made public. While he has undertaken to 
post transcripts of interviews on the inquiry website, this will be only done 
after the removal of any information which is regarded as being prejudicial 
to national security (Maley 2008a). 
Denying the Clarke inquiry the powers of a Royal Commission or 
commission of inquiry gives rise to a further concern, that witnesses would 
not have indemnity against either defamation or self-incrimination meaning 
that they could potentially face civil law suits. Thus, many witnesses could 
either decide not to appear before the inquiry or, even if they did, refuse to 
answer questions (Maley 2008a).  
In a press conference on the opening day of the inquiry (30 April), the 
Attorney-General emphasised how important it was that Mr Clarke be able 
to conduct the inquiry in a manner which gave due regard to the importance 
of protecting ‘sensitive national security information’ and to ensuring that 
‘ongoing investigations’ (including presumably into Dr Haneef) and 
criminal trials such as those currently under way in the United Kingdom 
would not be prejudiced (McLelland 2008a). Mr Clarke’s rejection of the 
request to seek expanded powers for the inquiry and his undertaking to 
‘sterilise’ interview transcripts suggest that he is not about to throw down 
the gauntlet to his political masters, at least as far as compelling witnesses to 
provide evidence and making available unexpurgated records of interview 
are concerned. A preoccupation with the sanctity of national security 
information and current investigations and criminal trials had been a feature 
of the press conference which Mr McLelland hosted in March where he 
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announced the terms of reference of the Clarke inquiry. In light of this and 
the other concerns with the Clarke inquiry, the Attorney-General’s assurance 
that ‘should at any stage he [Mr Clarke] come to the government and 
indicate that the absence of cooperation of any witness, any agency, or any 
person, is impeding a full and proper inquiry…then we will certainly have 
regard to any request, should it be made to provide powers of compellability 
in terms of documents and witnesses’ seems more than a little hollow 
(McLelland 2008a). 
 
4. The case of Izhar Ul-Haque  
The Ul-Haque case is much less celebrated but in its own way even more 
disturbing than the Haneef affair. For while this case brought to light serious 
flaws, deficiencies and excesses in the anti-terrorism and related legislation, 
the Ul-Haque case exposed the climate of fear, suspicion and contempt for 
the rule of law created by the former Government’s legislative approach to 
the war on terror. In this climate the AFP and ASIO were emboldened to 
exceed their authority and mandate by flagrantly violating the human rights 
of terror suspects, in this instance, Izhar Ul-Haque and committing criminal 
offences in the attempt to secure a conviction. It does bear at least one 
important similarity to the Haneef case, however, in that it also demonstrates 
the racial, ethnic and religious stereotyping, explicit or implicit, which 
helped to define the former Australian Government’s approach to the war of 
terror enshrined as this is in its legislative response. As with Haneef, the 
details of the Ul-Haque case need to be briefly recounted. Before doing so, 
however, a number of preliminary points about this case need to be made.  
Because the Ul-Haque case did not become a cause célèbre during the 
election campaign it did not expose the former Government, and its 
legislative response to the terrorist threat, to nearly the same level of media 
and public scrutiny as the Haneef affair generated. And, because the Ul-
Haque case put more of the focus on the activities of the law enforcement 
and security agencies the Government was largely shielded from direct 
scrutiny and criticism. For this reason, it is able to be dealt with in a more 
condensed manner than the Haneef case. Nevertheless, as will be seen 
below, NSW Supreme Court Justice Michael Adams’ findings regarding the 
behaviour of the AFP and ASIO in the Ul-Haque case demonstrate that it is 
at least as significant in that it exposes the dangers of the lack of a strict 
accountability regime for these agencies. This is a point that will be taken up 
below.  
Izhar Ul-Haque was charged with training with the Pakistan-based 
terrorist group Lashkar-e-Toiba (or, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba as it is otherwise 
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known) in 2003 well before it had been classified as a terrorist organisation 
by the United Nations. The Criminal Code Amendment (Hizbollah) Act 
2003 and similar legislation proscribing Hamas and Lashkar-e-Toiba passed 
later the same year either pre-empted or ignored the Al-Qaida and Taliban 
Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council which, for example, only 
added Lashkar-e-Toiba to the Consolidated List of individuals and groups 
belonging to or associated with Al-Qaida on 2 May 2005 (UN n.d.; neither 
Hamas nor Hizbollah is included on the Al-Qaida groups Consolidated List 
last updated on 17 October 2007 and neither is on the Taliban groups 
Consolidated List which, in any event, currently has no entities listed).  
On November 5th 2007 in the NSW Supreme Court, Justice Michael 
Adams found that all records of interview with Ul-Haque tendered by the 
Australian Federal Police as evidence were inadmissible forcing the Director 
of Public Prosecutions to withdraw the case just before a jury was 
empanelled (R v Ul-Haque [2007] NSWSC 1251). The AFP had also tried to 
elicit information from Ul-Haque about the terror suspect Faheem Lodhi by 
questioning him in a maximum security gaol for more than two hours but 
without first cautioning him or informing his lawyer of the interrogation 
(O’Brien 2008). Two AFP officers had demanded that Ul-Haque turn 
informant against Lodhi (by wearing a wire and spying for them) who was 
subsequently convicted and gaoled for 20 years for conspiring to bomb the 
national electricity grid.4 When he refused to do so, Ul-Haque was 
threatened that there would be serious and adverse consequences for him. 
While Ul-Haque had briefly trained with Lashkar-e-Toiba in early 2003, the 
law enforcement authorities had admitted to him that they accepted that his 
connection to the organisation had nothing to do with Australia but instead 
was because of his opposition to the Indian presence in Kashmir. The AFP 
records of interview were found to be inadmissible because of the improper 
and oppressive conduct of the AFP (and ASIO) officers involved, and 
because of the ‘inextricable link’ between AFP and ASIO including the 
disclosure by the AFP to ASIO of what Ul-Haque had said in interview. 
Justice Adams also found that two ASIO officers had committed the 
criminal offences of kidnapping and false imprisonment at common law and 
another offence under the Crimes Act (R v Ul-Haque [2007] NSWSC 1251). 
He also found that the conduct of the ASIO officers amounted to a gross 
breach of the powers they had been granted under a search warrant which 
had been issued to them.  
                                                 
4 The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal quashed Lodhi’s appeal against his conviction, a ruling recently 
upheld by the High Court of Australia.  
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In response to the collapse of the Ul-Haque case, the AFP initiated an 
inquiry headed by former NSW Chief Justice Sir Laurence Street in which 
former NSW Police Commissioner Ken Moroney and former head of the 
Defence Signals Directorate Martin Brady were also included (the Federal 
Attorney-General’s Department and the Inspector-General of Intelligence 
and Security, Ian Carnell, were other additions to the inquiry). The inquiry 
was charged with investigating the circumstances of the case and 
recommending changes to law enforcement agency policy and practice such 
as new procedures and protocols for improved communication and 
cooperation between the AFP and ASIO in joint operations (O’Brien 2008).  
At the conclusion of its review of the conduct of Ul-Haque case, the 
Street inquiry produced 10 recommendations on how in future joint agency 
counter-terrorism investigations could be better managed. One of its 
findings, for example, was that closer and more effective cooperation 
between the AFP and ASIO had been hampered by ‘mistrust, poor 
communication and a lack of basic equipment, such as “secure” desktop 
phones’ (Maley and O’Brien 20085). There was also an absence of a formal 
structure to facilitate joint decision making by the two agencies. To 
overcome these obstacles and deficiencies, the Street inquiry made 
recommendations for improving inter-agency communication at the 
operational level such as attaching ASIO officers to the joint counter-
terrorism teams in Sydney and Melbourne and the development of a joint 
operations protocol. Another initiative arising from the inquiry is the 
development of guidelines outlining the role of the Commonwealth Director 
of Public Prosecutions in counter-terrorism investigations.  
In addition to the above, there was also the matter of the lack of 
accountability of the AFP and ASIO. In a submission to the recent inquiry 
into the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment Bill 
2008, conducted by Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs6, the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law at Monash University 
identified a number of areas where a ‘dilution’ of the accountability of these 
agencies had been evident, citing the Haneef and Ul-Haque cases as 
examples. It also reminded the Senate Committee that in the Ul-Haque case, 
and as seen above, Justice Adams of the NSW Supreme Court had been 
highly critical of the conduct both of AFP and of ASIO officers. According 
                                                 
5 This is a curious finding in light of the ‘inextricable link’ between the two organisations identified by 
Justice Michael Adams.  
6 For clarification, the main purpose of the Amendment Bill is ‘to extend the sunset provisions that provide 
exemptions from the prohibition against listening to or copying communications passing over a 
telecommunications system’ which were due to expire on the 13th of June this year. 
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to the Castan Centre, the two cases demonstrate that the law enforcement 
and security agencies need to be held more accountable in exercising their 
statutory powers. The Senate Committee noted that the Centre’s submission 
‘emphasised that this was not just about protecting human rights, but also 
about preserving agencies’ integrity’ by requiring them to account more 
fully for the exercise of their powers (SSCLCA 2008: 31).’ Similar concerns 
about human rights protection and accountability moved Mr Petro Georgiou, 
a Liberal Party backbencher, to introduce a Private Member’s Bill into the 
House of Representatives in March 2008 with the aim of appointing an 
Independent Reviewer of Australia’s terrorism laws similar to the UK 
independent reviewer who had been appointed in 2000 (Lord Carlile of 
Berriew) (Georgiou 2008 and 2008a). The Government used its majority in 
the House to block debate on the Bill.  
 
5. Assessing the impact of the Haneef and Ul-Haque cases 
In its submission to the Clarke inquiry, the Gilbert + Tobin Centre for Public 
Law at the University of New South Wales noted that the fear of persecution 
in Australia’s Muslim communities engendered by the anti-terrorism 
legislation, a fear brought to light by the SLRC and PJCIS reviews, had been 
exacerbated by the manner in which the government, the AFP and ASIO had 
conducted the Haneef affair. The corrosive effect of the authorities’ conduct 
of the affair had not only been felt in Muslim communities, for it had also 
given rise to ‘deep cynicism’ across the wider Australian community. This 
was a worrying development in a security climate in which the Australian 
people should be able to have trust in their Government and confidence in its 
ability accurately to assess the level of threat faced by the country. As the 
submission pointed out: 
The promotion of social cohesion is integral to stopping terrorism in 
its tracks. More specifically, the cooperation and good relations 
between police and intelligence agencies and Australian Muslims is 
a crucial resource in unearthing and preventing potential terrorists. 
The ability under a range of Australian laws to pursue Dr Haneef 
over nothing more than his familial association with terrorism 
plotters in the United Kingdom understandably alarmed those in 
close-knit ethnic communities and must seriously have impacted on 
efforts to reassure Australia’s Muslims they have nothing to fear 
from these laws (Lynch, McGarrity, Williams 2008; a similar point 
is made, but not as forcefully, in the Law Council of Australia’s 
submission to the inquiry (LCA 2008: 23)).  
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The problem here is with the catch-all nature of the terrorism 
organisation offences that have been inserted into the Criminal Code, in 
particular, those relating to recklessly associating with, recklessly providing 
resources to and recklessly helping an organisation to carry out a terrorist 
act. Because these offences did not precisely target ‘unambiguous criminal 
activity’, a repeat of the Haneef affair was almost inevitable (for detailed 
analysis of the terrorism organisation and other terrorism offences see 
Lynch, MacDonald and Williams (eds.) 2007 and Lynch and Williams 
2006). Not only did excessively wide criminal laws of this type create 
opportunities for ‘executive overreach’, they could well make Australia less 
secure ‘by fostering cynicism and division in the community, and wasting 
police resources on investigations that are trivial or baseless (Lynch, 
McGarrity, Williams 2008).’ For these reasons Australia can ill afford to 
have a repeat of the Haneef affair. Hopefully, this is a consideration which 
will move Attorney-General McLelland and his Government quickly to set 
about removing the ambiguities, sloppy definitions and catch-all offences 
that are contained in Australia’s anti-terrorism laws. The legislative 
appointment of an Independent Reviewer of the anti-terrorism legislation 
would be an important first step in this direction.  
The Ul-Haque case gives rise to similar concerns and misgivings to those 
arising from the Haneef case, but ones that are more directly focused on the 
actions of the law enforcement and security authorities than on the behaviour 
of the Government itself. In the Ul-Haque case, the AFP and ASIO were 
found by Justice Adams to have behaved in a manner which was improper 
and oppressive, rendering the records of interview with Ul-Haque they had 
obtained inadmissible as evidence in a criminal trial. It is to say the least 
alarming that these two agencies, which should be committed to upholding 
the rule of law and protecting Australia’s national security, feel that they can 
behave in such a reckless and unlawful manner. But it is even more 
frightening when ASIO officers commit criminal offences in a desperate and 
misguided attempt to collect enough evidence to have an accused but still 
innocent person convicted of criminal offences. This is a clear perversion of 
due process and the rule of law which undermines rather than preserves the 
AFP’s and ASIO’S integrity and reputation in the wider community.  
Just as importantly, such behaviour undermines national security. Even if 
national security is taken to mean nothing more than the security of the 
nation from terrorist attack, then it is clear that in genuine terrorism cases the 
national security of Australia would be gravely weakened were the AFP and 
ASIO to behave in the same manner as they did in the Ul-Haque affair. But, 
if national security is to mean more than just the protection of the country 
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from terrorist attack, and include as it should the security and liberty of the 
person from arbitrary arrest and detention and similar abuses of state power, 
then these two agencies have already effectively undermined Australia’s 
national security (see Rix 2008 for an elaboration of some of these points).  
Notwithstanding the outrageous and completely unacceptable behaviour 
of the AFP and ASIO in the Haneef and Ul-Haque cases, they cannot take all 
the blame for the abuses of due process and human rights that occurred. The 
lack of accountability of these agencies for the exercise of their statutory 
powers is just one element, however important, of the political climate in 
which these abuses were allowed to take place. Other elements have only 
recently come to light.  
In a case being heard before the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal (AAT) in Brisbane it has been revealed that representatives of the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (then John Howard’s department) 
met with Immigration and Foreign Affairs officials on 4 July 2007 (Haneef 
was arrested on 2 July) to discuss how the Haneef case should be handled. 
The action in the AAT was launched by lawyers representing Mohamed 
Haneef in a bid to assist the Clarke inquiry to procure documents relating to 
the case. The inquiry does not itself have the power to compel Government 
departments and agencies to provide it with documents. One of the 
documents which the action seeks to procure is the options paper developed 
by the various departments represented at the meeting on 4 July which set 
out the possible courses of action that could be taken should the APF lay 
charges against Haneef (who was charged on 14 July). According to 
Haneef’s lawyers, ‘the involvement of Mr Howard’s department raised the 
possibility the former prime minister may have colluded with his 
immigration minister to create a political storm similar to the Tampa 
controversy which helped the Coalition win the 2001 election (The 
Australian, 17 June 2008)’. It is almost inconceivable that Mr Howard was 
not briefed by his senior advisors about the meeting. While most of the 
requested documents had been provided to Mr Haneef’s legal team, about 15 
documents which Government lawyers claim either it is not in the public 
interest to release or are exempt from freedom of information legislation 
have yet to be released. The Immigration Department has so far refused to 
release the options paper.  
The political climate created by the former Government’s anti-terrorism 
legislation not only emboldened the AFP and ASIO to perpetrate abuses of 
due process and human rights. It also sanctioned representatives of 
Government departments to meet and agree on what could be done in the 
event that Dr Haneef was charged with committing a terrorist offence. What 
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could be done in this event was clearly to be determined by what would put 
the Government in the best possible light and cause it the least amount of 
damage in the public’s eyes. Whether or not the Prime Minister and 
Immigration Minister were directly involved, and whether or not they knew 
of the meeting, is really not the point. The more important point is the 
politicisation of the public service and the corruption of its capacity for 
providing independent advice to the Howard Government or any other that 
might have succeeded it.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The Haneef and Ul-Haque cases are both important for they reveal how a 
crude association of Islam with terrorism, an important element of the 
political climate created by the Howard Government’s anti-terrorism 
legislation, permitted the AFP and ASIO to perpetrate abuses of due process 
and human rights. And at the very time when social cohesion, Australia’s 
best defence against terrorist violence, is most required the political climate 
and the abuses it has allowed have sowed the seeds of division, suspicion 
and cynicism in the Australian community. But their importance goes further 
than even these compelling considerations suggest. These two cases also 
reveal how easily Australia’s national security can be endangered by the two 
agencies when they are not subject to a strict accountability regime. If they 
were to behave in the same way in genuine terrorism cases as they did in the 
Ul-Haque affair then Australia’s national security would be in grave danger 
in the sense that it would not be secure from terrorist attack. But if national 
security means more than the protection of the country from terrorist attack, 
and include also the security and liberty of the person from arbitrary arrest 
and detention, then Australia’s national security has already been 
undermined. Moreover, the politicisation of the public service has seriously 
compromised its capacity for providing independent advice to government. 
Thus far, the Rudd Government has shown little inclination to escape the 
legacy of its predecessor. It can only be hoped that as it grows in maturity 
and self-confidence it will become more inclined to do so. Australia’s 
national security depends on it.  
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